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ABSTRACT

An abstract of the thesis of Laura J. Hickman for the Master of Science in
Administration of Justice presented July 10, 1995.

Title: An Assessment of the Impact of Intimate Victim-Offender
Relationship on Sentencing in Serious Assault Cases.

It is generally agreed that a criminal justice system reflects the

values of the society within which it exists. The presence of patriarchal
social values will likely affect the response of the criminal justice system
to intimate violence. While the perpetration of violence against another is
a violation of an important social norm, patriarchal values may function to
discount the seriousness of such an act, if the violence is perpetrated by a
man against his girlfriend or wife. This discount of seriousness may lead
to less severe punishment for men who assault their intimates than to men
who assault nonintimates.
The purpose of the present study was to test the hypothesis that men
who are convicted of committing serious assaults against female intimates
receive more lenient punishment than men who are convicted of
committing serious assault against nonintimates. Punishment was defined
as sentencing outcomes, i. e. type and length of sentence. The sentences
of offenders convicted of felony assaults as the major offense and subject
to sentencing guidelines in Oregon in 1993 were examined.
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Chi-square tests were used to compare the sentence types of
intimate and nonintimate violence offenders. Two-tailed !-tests and
multiple linear regression were used to examine the relationship between
victim-offender relationship and length of sentence. It appears that the
presence of Oregon's sentencing guidelines, rather than victim-offender
relationship, had the greatest effect upon the severity of punishment. This
finding suggests that the guidelines may be responsible for minimizing the
impact of patriarchal values on sentencing decisions in serious assault
cases.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Crime is a product of social values and norms. Society, guided by
its values, create rules, or norms, by which individual members are to live.
Some norms are considered to be so important to the welfare of society
that violations of these rules are defined as crimes. In some instances,
violation of important social rules are excused because they uphold social
values of a higher order. For example, in American society, homicide is a
crime, unless the murderer acted in self-defense. In this case, the social
value placed upon the right to protect one's own life outweighs the social
prohibition against murder. Violations of social rules that are defined as
crimes are discouraged partially by the threat of punishment. The severity
of the punishment typically depends upon the importance of the social
norm that was violated and the social values relevant to the particular
situation (Eitzen & Zinn, 1988). For example, a transient who commits a
crime by selling illegal drugs may be seen as deserving of more severe
punishment if he or she sells drugs to children than if he or she sells drugs
to other transients. The same norm has been violated in both cases. The
latter crime, however, may be seen as a more serious threat to the welfare
of society and deserving of more severe punishment because the violation
also conflicts with the high social value placed upon the protection of
children.
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Violent assaults are seen as a serious threat to the welfare of society
and, thus, are defined as criminal behavior and deserving of punishment.
Violent assaults may be seen as more or less of a social threat, depending
upon the relevance of important social values in individual situations. The
present study sought to uncover the effect of patriarchal values on the
severity of punishment given to individuals who commit serious assaults.
Specifically, the present study examined whether social values relating to
victim-offender relationships influenced the severity of punishment for
serious assault.

CHAPTER II
THE LITERATURE
Social and legal tolerance of violence against female intimates is
not unique to American society. The historical record clearly
demonstrates that men have long treated women as their property (Martin,
1981; Brownmiller, 1975). Common law tradition, from which American
law is derived, reflects the wife-as-property philosophy through the
concept of coverture. Coverture dictates that marriage is a state that
erases the legal identity of the wife and subjects her body and property to
the unrelinquishable control and will of her husband (Marcus, 1994;
Friedman, 1993; Elias, 1986; Szechtman, 1985; Martin, 1981). Common
law, furthermore, explicitly permitted husbands to physically assault their
wives, but prohibited beatings with a rod any thicker than the width of the
man's thumb. American law tended to depart from this "rule of thumb" by
allowing husbands to physically "discipline" their wives, but not to beat
them (Marcus, 1994; Klein, 1982).
In her ground-breaking historical study of family violence in the
United States, Pleck (1987) traced the evolution of the present socio-legal
perspective on intimate violence against women. 1 Her work showed that
the modern feminist movement was only one of three historic American
1

The term intimate violence is subsumed in the term domestic violence, but
domestic violence refers to a group of intimate and familial relationships. Intimate
violence is distinguished from domestic violence in that intimate violence occurs in
the context of a romantic relationship and not within parent-child, sibling or other
familial relationships (Fineman & Mykitiuk, 1994; Pleck, 1987).
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social movements that brought about legal and social reform in the area of
family violence. The first reform movement took place among the
Puritans, of the Massachusetts Bay colony, in the mid-seventeenth century.
These colonists were the first in the new world to pass laws prohibiting
wife beating and child abuse. The second reform movement occurred
during the late 19th century and focused on criminalizing alcohol
consumption. This movement championed abused women and children
because they were viewed as victims of drunken husbands. The third
reform movement surfaced in the mid- I 970s, when battered women were
"discovered" by twentieth century feminists reformers. This third
movement, propelled by feminist, civil rights and law and order interests,
brought about the most dramatic social and legal changes in the area of
intimate violence against women. Largely as a result of these three social
movements, physically assaulting wives is now a crime in most
jurisdictions in the United States (Gordon, 1988; Pleck, 1987).
The mere passage of legislation prohibiting violence against women
does not guarantee that laws are enforced nor does it ensure that intimate
violence is seen as a serious social problem (Marcus, 1994; Buzawa &
Buzawa, 1993; Friedman, 1993; Pleck, 1987; Erez, 1986; Jolin, 1984).
body of literature addressing the issue of the criminal justice system's
response (or lack thereof) to intimate violence has been slowly and
steadily growing since the last great reform movement of the 1970s.

A
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Police response to intimate violence has been an area of particular interest
of researchers (Dunford, 1992; Jaffe, Wolfe, Telford & Austin, 1986; Berk
& Newton, 1985; Sherman & Berk, 1984).

The literature relating to the probability of arrest suggests that
perpetrators of violent assaults on intimates, whether the victim is married
to, cohabitating with or dating the assailant, are much less likely to be
arrested than perpetrators of similar violence against nonintimate victims
(Cohen, 1994; Buzawa & Buzawa, 1993; Mcferron, 1989; Pleck, 1987;
Brez, 1986; Gondolf & Worden & Pollitz, 1984; Martin, 1981; Do bash &
Dobash, 1979; Parnas, 1967). In fact, incidents of intimate assault are
frequently recorded and referred to by police as "domestic disturbances," a
label that minimizes the seriousness of such assaults (Stanford & Mowry,
1990; Brez, 1986; Breslin, 1978). When police do take action in intimate
assault cases, arrests are most often made on misdemeanor charges,
regardless of the severity of the injury to the victim, the assailant's
injurious intent, or involvement of weapons (Buzawa & Buzawa, 1993;
Langan & Innes, 1986; Edwards, 1985).
Public pressure and lawsuits brought against police departments that
refused to arrest intimate assailants brought about some changes in police
practices by the early 1980s. But by far the greatest catalyst for radical
change in arrest practices came from an initial research study conducted
by Sherman and Berk (1984) in Minneapolis, in 1981. The findings of this

6

experimentally designed study revealed that arresting intimate assaulters
had a greater deterrent effect than other methods of police intervention,
such as mediation and separation. In the wake of this study, numerous
police polices and laws were enacted that support or mandate the arrest of
intimate assaulters (Buzawa & Buzawa, 1993; Gelles, 1993; Gondolf &
McFerron, 1989; Williams & Hawkins, 1989).
The Minneapolis study (Sherman & Berk, 1984) was followed by a
series of replication studies in the cities of Omaha, Milwaukee, Charlotte,
Metro-Dade County, Colorado Springs and Atlanta. The findings from
these studies lent only partial support to the deterrent effect of arrest
found by Sherman and Berk (1984). Because of methodological
differences the original Minneapolis findings are not fully comparable to
the multi-city studies. Still, the replication studies did call into question
the suitability of arrest as the sole response to intimate violence. Arrest
of intimate violence offenders in the cities of Omaha, Milwaukee and
Charlotte seemed to increase their assaultive behavior, rather than to
decrease it. This "backfiring" of arrest in these cities was most clearly
associated with unemployment among the intimate assailants (Sherman,
Schmidt & Rogan, 1992). In addition to the Minneapolis study and the
multi-city replication studies, other researchers have attempted to shed
light on this issue (Dunford, 1992; Jaffe, Wolfe, Telford & Austin, 1986;
Berk & Newton, 1985). To date it is not clear whether arrest deters
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intimate violence in general or if particular types of assaulters, such as the
employed, are more likely to be discouraged from further assaults by
arrest than are other types of intimate assaulters (Buzawa & Buzawa,
1993 ).
While few studies exist that examine the response of prosecutors
and courts to cases involving intimate violence, the available evidence
consistently shows that prosecutors as well as the courts tend to treat
intimate violence cases differently from stranger violence cases. Intimate
assault cases at the prosecution and court level tend to be dismissed at a
disproportionately high rate, downgraded to less serious offenses and
regarded as needlessly consuming scarce resources (Hart, 1993; Ford,
1991; McGuire, 1991; Crowley, Sigler & Johnson, 1990; Pl eek, 19 8 7;
Langan & Innes, 1986; Lerman, 1986; Ellis, 1984; McLeod, 1983; Stanko,
1982; Davis & Smith, 1981; Martin, 1981; Brosi, 1979; Vera Institute,
1977). There is little empirical information about the supervision of
intimate violence offenders within the corrections component of the
criminal justice system.

CHAPTER III
MAJOR THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
Several theoretical perspectives currently dominate the literature
regarding the etiology of, and social response to, intimate violence.
Proponents of the psychological perspective view intimate assaults as the
result of some pathology within the individual offender and/or victim (see
for example, Roy, 1977). Studies of intimate violence originating from
this perspective seek to uncover perpetrator and/or victim personality
characteristics, childhood experiences, level of social skill development
and the like, to explain the presence of violence within intimate
relationships. Sociological perspectives cite structural factors within
society as the causes of violence against intimates (Yllo, 198 8). Research
conducted under the sociological umbrella examines intimate violence in
the context of social class, race, gender and family systems (see for
example, Gelles, 1979). Feminist perspectives tend to view patriarchal, or
male-dominated, social organizations and gender arrangements as the
sources of intimate violence. 2 They assert that there is a clear distinction
between male-perpetrated and female-perpetrated intimate violence.
Intimate violence against women is seen as a much larger and more
pressing social problem than female violence against male intimates
because male violence against females is a "normal" part of a patriarchal
2

A patriarchy is a societal structure that institutionalizes male control of
women, both within intimate relationships and within the larger society (Lerner,
1986).
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society. Feminist-oriented studies of violence against women focus on
gender inequality, social power and the functional utility of intimate
violence within a society (see Yllo & Bograd, 1988).

Theoretical Approach of the Present Study
The present study examines intimate violence from a feminist
perspective. There are several forms of feminist theory, most of which
share as a central concern the subordination of women. 3 Each theory
provides different explanations for this subordination and proposes
different methods for ending it (Oil en burger & Moore, 1991 ). In her
discussion of the application of feminist theory to crime, Simpson (1989)
outlines the three dominant theories - liberal, socialist and radical
feminism. Liberal feminism views the subordination of women as the
result of a lack of equal opportunity for women within society. Women
are disadvantaged by traditional social roles that separate men from
women and foster discrimination against women who seek to enter the
"man's world." Liberal feminists assert that the subordination of women

3

According to Lerner (1986), the term "subordination" is a better description
of gender relations within a patriarchal society than the commonly used term
"oppression." Subordination implies a lower relative social position, but also that
women may submit willingly to an inferior social position to men for purposes of
survival and gaining advantages within the society, such as male protection.
Oppression implies "forceful subordination"of women. While this term adequately
describes the act of beating a woman into submission to male authority, this
oppression occurs within a social structure of male domination and female
subordination. Thus, subordination is a broader term that applies to gender
relations in general and in the context of intimate relationships.
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can be eliminated by creating opportunities for women within society and
ending discrimination against them, while breaking down traditional
gender roles and stereotypes. Differential treatment of intimate violence
offenders by the criminal justice system is viewed by liberal feminists as a
result of inequities within the system. Strategies to produce more
equitable treatment of all offenders, such as sentencing guidelines, are
seen as important to the removal of discrimination toward intimate
violence offenders from the criminal justice system.
Socialist feminism blames the subordination of women on economic
systems. Capitalism and the ownership of private property have placed
white men in powerful positions of control over the labor of all women
and many men. Recreating economic systems and eliminating social
classes are seen as solutions to gender subordination (Ollenburger &
Moore, 1991; Simpson, 1989; Messerschmidt, 1986). Socialist feminists
link the criminal justice system's treatment of intimate violence offenders
to the lack of economic power of intimate violence victims. If female
victims of intimate violence were economically empowered by a
restructuring of existing economic systems, according to socialist
feminists, the criminal justice system would respond to intimate violence
offenders differently.
Radical feminism, like socialist feminism, views a social system, in
this case, patriarchy, as the main source of the subordination of women.
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Unlike the socialist feminists, radical feminists claim that the
subordination of women by men was the first and most basic of all forms
of human subordination (Ollenburger & Moore, 1991 ). Historically,
patriarchy, a society structured around male-domination, was produced as
a result of the biological "disadvantages" of being female, i.e. less
physical strength and the dependency on others necessitated by pregnancy,
giving birth and caring for small children. Female biological factors
allowed men to gain and maintain control. Physical violence was one
"natural" method for men to control women. Radical feminists cite
patriarchal social structures as the source of the subordination of women
and claim that these social structures must be changed, in order to end
male domination of women in general and intimate violence in particular
(Ollenburger & Moore, 1991; Simpson, 1989).
Radical feminist theory is particularly useful in explaining the
phenomenon of intimate violence because of its explicit focus on male use
of violence to control women (Martin, 1981; Dobash & Dobash, 1979).
Partly as a consequence of the male strength advantage and the forced
dependence of women on men during the child-bearing years, males used
violence and/or the threat of violence to gain and maintain control over
females. The intimate relationship is merely a microcosm of the larger
society, where men use violence and the threat of violence to subordinate
and control women in a number of contexts. Within the domestic sphere,
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individual males have asserted ownership of individual females - their
wives and daughters. Men are to assure that "their" women do not
challenge the authority of male rule, both within the home and outside. It
is within this context that the beating of women by their intimate partners
takes place. Intimate violence becomes a tool used to terrorize women
into submission to male authority, both collectively and individually
(Rich, 1986; Dobash & Dobash, 1979).
It is generally agreed that criminal justice systems reflect the values

of the society within which they exists (Anderson & Newman, 1993;
Friedman, 1993 ). The presence of patriarchal social values is therefore
likely to affect the response of the criminal justice system to intimate
violence. While the use of violence against another violates an important
social norm, patriarchal values may function to discount the seriousness of
such violations, if the violence is perpetrated by a man against his woman
(Beasley & Thoman, 1994; Mahoney, 1994; Marcus, 1994; Rapaport, 1994;
Romany, 1994; Schneider, 1994; Smart, 1989; Klein, 1982; Martin, 1981;
Dobash & Dobash, 1977/78, 1979; Brownmiller, 1975).
Until recently intimate violence was generally not considered to be
crime. Today, mandatory arrest laws and other pro-arrest policies have
largely ended the exemption of intimate violence from the social
prohibition against violence. The redefining of intimate violence as crime
implies that perpetrators of intimate violence deserve punishment. What
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is not clear, however, is whether intimate violence is punished as severely
as nonintimate violence. The continued existence of patriarchal values
may mean that intimate violence receives leniency where nonintimate
violence does not. Therefore, a man who perpetrates violence against his
woman may be punished less severely than a man who perpetrates violence
against a man or a woman belonging to another man. 4 Based upon these
theoretical assertions, the present study sought to determine whether the
criminal justice system punished men, who were convicted of serious
assaults against intimates, less severely than men who assaulted
nonintimates. 5
The impact of patriarchal values on the severity of punishment of
intimate assaulters relative to nonintimate assaulters predicted by radical
feminist theory may be lessened somewhat by Oregon's sentencing
guidelines. The Oregon legislature, in 1989, voted to implement a set of
standardized administrative rules for judges to follow when sentencing
individuals for felony crimes. Standardized rules, or sentencing

4

This same line of reasoning explains why strangers who rape women receive
more severe punishment than acquaintances who rape women (Estrich, 1987).
5

Radical feminist theory regards the dynamics involved in the criminal justice
response to intimate violence by females against males as qualitatively different
from the dynamics involved in the response to intimate violence by males against
females. Gay and lesbian intimate violence also elicits a unique response from the
criminal justice system (Rich, 1986). While the radical feminist perspective may be
applied to the criminal justice processing of female-on-male and gay and lesbian
intimate violence, it is beyond the scope of this study to develop several sets of
theoretical propositions.
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guidelines, were seen as necessary because it appeared that unregulated
judicial discretion often produced wide disparity in the severity of
sentences given to individuals convicted of similar crimes (Bogan, 1990).
One of the goals of Oregon's sentencing guidelines was to reduce the
effects of extralegal factors on sentencing. The Oregon legislature wanted
to create a set of rules that would produce similar sentences for similar
crimes and criminals. To that end, the sentencing guidelines were
implemented and are applicable to all felony crimes committed in the state
of Oregon on or after November 1, 1989 (OCJC, 1989).
Despite standardized rules for sentencing offenders, some
researchers have found that sentencing guidelines may not completely
remove extralegal factors from sentencing decisions. Sentencing disparity
based on extralegal factors such as race and socioeconomic status may still
be present under sentencing guidelines rules (Miller, 1994; OCJC, 1994;
Oregon Supreme Court Task Force, 1994; D'Alessio & Stolzenberg, 1993).
The use of sentencing guidelines in Oregon may lessen but not eliminate
the impact of patriarchal values on sentencing in cases of serious intimate
assault.
The Research Question
Do intimate violence offenders subject to sentencing guidelines and
convicted of serious assaults in Oregon in 1993 receive more lenient
punishment than nonintimate violence offenders under like circumstances?
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Hypotheses
The radical feminist perspective regarding the relative severity of
punishment leads to the following hypotheses:
1. Intimate violence offenders are more likely than nonintimate violence
offenders to receive a sentence type of probation rather than prison.

2. Intimate violence offenders receive shorter sentences than nonintimate
violence offenders.
3. Intimate violence offenders are sentenced to fewer custody units and
jail days than nonintimate violence offenders.
4. Eligible intimate violence offenders are more likely than are eligible
nonintimate violence offenders to be given optional probation, instead of
pnson.
5. Intimate violence offenders who used firearms during the commission
of the assault are less likely than nonintimate violence offenders to receive
a gun minimum sentence.
6. When there are departures from presumptive sentences, both downward
dispositional and downward durational departures are more likely to occur
in the sentences of intimate violence offenders than in the sentences of
nonintimate violence offenders.
7. Downward durational departures result in shorter sentences for intimate
violence offenders than nonintimate violence offenders.

CHAPTER IV
METHODS
Subjects
The population for this study is composed of male offenders who:

1. were convicted in Oregon of completed or attempted Assault I, II or
completed Assault III as the major offense, 2. were subject to Oregon's
sentencing guidelines and 3. had a conviction or sentencing date during
the calendar year of 1993. There were 4 76 offenders who met these
criteria identified through the use of the Oregon Department of
Corrections' automated database, known as the Offender Profile System
(OPS).6.1
Data Sources
The data for this study came from six sources; OPS, Oregon
Criminal Justice Council's (OCJC) sentencing guidelines database,
6

One nonintimate violence offender was excluded from the population because
he was sentenced as a dangerous offender. This type of offender is defined
statutorily as suffering from tla severe personality disorder", under ORS. 161.737.
The length of his sentence was more than eight standard deviations above the mean.
Six offenders were excluded from the study because their assault convictions came
as the result of attacks on inmates while they were incarcerated for other crimes.
Of the offenders with a felony assault as the most serious conviction, during 1993,
18 were excluded from this study's population because they were not subject to
sentencing guidelines, due to a crime commission date before November 1, 1989.
ti

7

ti

The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that in 1991 12 percent of the male
state prisoners serving sentences for assault nationwide had been convicted of
assaulting an intimate (BJS, 1993). Based upon this finding and the lack of other
information suggesting that the percent of intimate violence offenders within the
defined population would be larger, a census rather than a sample was drawn from
the defined population of offenders in order to ensure that enough intimate violence
offenders were identified to allow tests of hypotheses.
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Assault III, ORS 163.185, 163.175, and 163.165. 10
Dependent Variables: Sentencing Outcomes
For the purposes of this study, punishment is defined as sentencing
outcomes. Sentencing outcomes are reflected in type and length of
sentence and are derived from Oregon's sentencing guidelines. The
Oregon Criminal Justice Council (OCJC) was created by the Oregon
legislature for the purpose of developing and monitoring the
implementation and functioning of the sentencing guidelines. The OCJC
concluded that the two most relevant pieces of information in the
determination of sentence severity ought to be 1. the seriousness of the
crime committed and 2. the offender's criminal history. Seriousness was
ranked from one to eleven, one being the least serious and eleven being
the most serious. For example, the crime of bigamy was assigned a
seriousness ranking of one, because it was perceived to be a relatively
minor felony. The crime of murder was assigned a seriousness ranking of
eleven, because it was viewed as a very serious felony. Attempted crimes
received seriousness rankings two levels below those of completed crimes.

10

Attempted Assault III is not included here because this crime is statutorily
defined as a misdemeanor. The narrow focus on felony assault crimes should not
be understood as denial of the existence of intimate violence in many other forms
of crime. For example, intimates are robbed, sexually assaulted, burglarized,
kidnapped, stalked and murdered. Broadening the study to include these other
types of crimes was not possible in this context, largely because Oregon's crime
data did not identify intimate violence offenders. Limited resources prevented this
broader focus.
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Murder was ranked as an eleven, so attempted murder was ranked as a
nine. Criminal history was also grouped into categories, based upon the
offenders' number and type of prior juvenile and adult convictions. The
categories are alphabetic and range from the least serious, category I, to
the most serious category A. Prior convictions for crimes against people,
such as robbery, were considered to be more serious than convictions for
crimes against property, such as theft (see Appendix A for contents of the
criminal history categories).
By placing the values representing crime seriousness on the Y-axis
and the alphabetical categories representing criminal history on the Xaxis, the OCJC created a sentencing grid. The grid prescribes sentence
type, i. e. probation or prison, and sentence length for each grid block.
Individual offenders are sentenced to the type and length of sentence
specified within the grid block that is at the intersection of each offender's
criminal history and crime seriousness scores (see Appendix B for the
sentencing guidelines grid). The resulting sentence is the presumptive
sentence. Presumptive prison sentences specify length of sentence in a
range of months. Judges may sentence offenders to a number of months
within that range.

Presumptive sentences of prison also carry

presumptive terms of post-prison supervision (OCJC, 1989). 11

11

Parole officers were renamed post-prison supervision officers, but continue
to supervise those offenders still on parole under the old system.
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Presumptive probation sentences consist of a pre-determined length
in months and a maximum number of custody units. Custody units may
include jail and various other forms of intermediate sanctions, such as
house arrest and mandatory in-patient drug treatment. For example, grid
block 6-G prescribes a presumptive sentence of probation and a maximum
of 180 custody units (see Appendix B for the sentencing guidelines grid).
This means that the offender may be sentenced to a maximum of 90 days
in jail. The remaining 90 custody units may be used to sentence the
offender to other forms of custody, such as in-patient substance abuse
treatment. Presumptive probation sentences provide only the maximum
number of custody units and jail days to which judges may sentence
offenders. Judges have the option of sentencing offenders to no custody
units or jail days. In other words, presumptive probation sentences may
result in a specified number of months of probation and nothing more
(OCJC, 1994).
The OCJC anticipated that occasionally circumstances of the crime
or characteristics of the offender would make the presumptive sentence
prescribed by the guidelines inappropriate. For example, an offender may
be seen as deserving of a less severe sentence than the one prescribed
under the guidelines if he or she suffers from a mental illness. In cases
like these, judges may sentence offenders to a different type of sentence or
length of sentence, if they cite "substantial and compelling reasons" why
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the presumptive guidelines sentence is not appropriate for a particular
offender (OCJC, 1989). The "substantial and compelling reasons" under
the guidelines are called mitigating and aggravating factors. Mitigating
factors are reasons why particular offenders ought to be given a more
lenient sentence than the sentence prescribed by the guidelines.
Aggravating factors are reasons why particular offenders ought to be given
a more severe sentence than the sentence prescribed by the guidelines (see
Appendix C for a list of the mitigating and aggravating factors).
A sentence of a different type or length than the sentence prescribed
by the guidelines is called a departure. If a judge sentences an offender to
probation, when the presumptive sentence calls for prison, or gives an
offender a shorter sentence than the one provided by the guidelines, this is
called a downward departure. The judge must cite at least one of the nine
mitigating factors to explain why she or he felt that the departure from the
guidelines was warranted. If a judge gives a sentences that exceeds the
presumptive sentence in type of length, this is called an upward departure.
The judge must then cite at least one of the twelve aggravating factors as
justification for the departure (OCJC, 1994).
A few grid blocks within the guidelines prescribe a presumptive
sentence of prison, but judges have the option of sentencing offenders to
probation, without departing from the guidelines, if certain conditions are
met. Offenders within the grid blocks 8-G, 8-H or 8-1, may be sentenced
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to probation, instead of prison, if they 1. did not use a firearm in the
commission of their offense, 2. were not under bench or correctional
supervision at the time of the offense and 3. are able to participate in
treatment. Offenders who satisfy these conditions are referred to as
"eligible for optional probation" (OCJC, 1994).
In order to assist the OCJC in monitoring the functioning of
sentencing guidelines, Oregon law (ORS 13 7. 0 I 0) requires that all courts
submit a sentencing guideline worksheet containing sentencing
information for each felony conviction to various criminal justice
agencies, including the Department of Corrections and the OCJC. The
sentencing guidelines worksheets are intended to provide a simplified
format for judges to use to determine and report individual offender's
presumptive sentences based on the sentencing grid and to justify
departures from that grid (see Appendix D for worksheet). The OCJC
collects these worksheets and enters the information in the existing
sentencing guidelines database. The OCJC uses the information from this
database to produce an annual report that summarizes sentencing practices
in Oregon. 12

12

When errors are discovered or when worksheets are not filled out
completely, the OCJC contacts the sentencing court, in order to request correction
of the error(s) and/or more information. Through this quality control process, the
OCJC found that ten percent of the reports that it received in 1993 contained some
type of error, either in calculation of the crime seriousness ranking or the criminal
history classification, missing data, an improper sentence imposed or guidelines
departure error. These errors were corrected by the sentencing court in 27 percent
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In the present study, sentencing outcomes took the form of number
of custody units, number of jail days, use of gun minimum sentences, use
of optional probation and type, direction and length of sentencing
guidelines departure ordered by the sentencing judge as a result of the
most serious assault conviction. Sentencing outcome variables were coded
as follows:
~ of sentence was defined as either prison or probation. 13

Length of sentence was recorded in months.
Number of custody units applied only to probationers.
Number of

jail~

applied only to probationers.

Use_fil gun minimum was recorded if the judge imposed a gun minimum
sentence as a result of the offender's firearm use during the commission of
the assault. Oregon law (ORS 161.610) states that offenders who use a
gun in the commission of an offense shall be given a mandatory sentence
of 60 months. If the presumptive guidelines sentence is longer than 60
months, the judge is directed to give the offender the longer presumptive
sentence. Judges may reduce the length of a gun minimum sentence by
citing mitigating factors (OCJC, 1994 ).

of the cases, thus reducing the overall error in the sentencing guidelines worksheets
entered in the database to approximately eight percent (OCJC, 1994). There is no
reason to expect that this error is systematic or that it will disproportionately affect
sentences for the crime of assault.
13

Probation sentences include those offenders who were sentenced to optional
probation.
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Use of optional probation applied only to the sentencing of offenders who
1. fell into grid blocks 8-G, 8-H and 8-1, 2. were not under correctional
supervision at the time of the assault, 3. did not use a firearm in the
commission of the crime and 4. were amenable to treatment. Whether or
not eligible offenders were sentenced to optional probation, instead of
prison, was recorded.

TuM

of guidelines departure had two attributes. The first applied to

dispositional departures, which are sentence types that depart from the
guidelines, such as probation instead of prison. The second attribute,
durational departures, referred to sentences of a different length than is
prescribed by the guidelines.
Direction of departure reflected whether the imposed sentence was more or
less severe than the sentence that the guidelines provided. Increased
severity may mean sentences of greater length or more restrictive
sentencing type, e.g. number of jail days, number of custody units and/or
upgraded supervision status from probation to prison. Direction of
departure was coded as either upward (increased severity of sentence) or
downward (decreased severity of sentence).
Length of Durational Departure was measured in one of two ways. In the
case of an upward durational departure, length of departure was calculated
by subtracting the maximum presumptive sentence length from the actual
sentence length. If the departure was downward, length of departure was
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determined by subtracting the minimum presumptive sentence from the
ordered sentence. 14
The following variables were used as controls, i.e. variable besides
victim-offender relationship that may affect sentencing outcomes:
Crime of conviction was either completed or attempted Assault I, II or
completed Assault III.
Seriousness ranking of the offense may only vary in completed or
attempted Assault I convictions, the other assault offenses have been
preassigned seriousness rankings. 15 Completed Assault I received a
seriousness ranking of ten, but was reduced to a ranking of nine if the
"victim(s) substantially contributed to the commission of the offense by
precipitating attack" (ORS 163 .185). Attempted Assault I receives a
seriousness ranking of eight, but was reduced to a ranking of seven under
the same victim precipitation rule (OCJC, 1994 ).

14

For example, if an offender fells into guidelines grid block 8-D, her or his
presumptive sentence ranges from 27 to 28 months in prison. If the judge ordered
an upward durational departure to 30 months, instead of the maximum 28 months,
the length of the departure would equal two months. If that same offender were
given a downward durational departure to 25 months, the length of the durational
departure would be negative two months.
15

Completed and attempted Assault II convictions and completed Assault III
convictions are preassigned seriousness rankings. Completed Assault II receives a
ranking of eight, while both Attempted Assault II and completed Assault III receive
a seriousness ranking of six.

26

Supervision status at the time of the commission of the assault was of
three types: I. no supervision, 2. probation, and 3. post-prison/parole. 16
Offender use of a firearm was recorded if the offender used a firearm
during the commission of the assault.
Criminal history classification, ranging from A to I, was based on prior
criminal convictions and determined the offenders' location along the Xaxis of the sentencing guidelines grid (see Appendix A).
Procedures 17

Sentencing outcome data came largely from the OCJC guidelines
automated database. The information was coded in the same manner that
it was coded on the sentencing guidelines worksheet and in the sentencing
guidelines database. 18 When missing data were encountered within the
OCJC database, the OPS, offender institution files, offender supervision
field files, probation officers and institution counselors were consulted to
acquire the needed information.
Information on the independent variable, victim-offender
relationship, was not recorded in the OCJC database. Police reports,

16

If an offender was under both probation and post-prison/parole supervision at
the time of the assault, the offender was coded by the more restrictive type of
supervision, i. e. post-prison/parole.
17

These procedures were proposed to the Human Subjects Research Review
Committee which considered them to be exempt from Human Subjects review.
18

Inter-coder reliability is not discussed in the present study because this
author personally conducted all data collection and coding.
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presentence investigation reports, institution counselor narratives,
supervision chronologies, probation and parole/post-prison supervision
violation reports, court documents and treatment reports were searched for
intimate relationship indicators, i. e. the description of the victim as a
present or former girlfriend or wife. If one or more of these documents
referred to the victim of the most serious assault as the offender's present
or former girlfriend or wife, the offender was categorized as an intimate
violence offender. If the victim was described as anyone other than a
present or former girlfriend or wife, the offender was categorized as a
nonintimate violence offender. 19
Presentence investigation reports, which offer a detailed description
of the crime, the circumstances surrounding it, and the victim-offender
relationship, were sometimes available through the OPS. Victim-offender
relationship was determined through the use of the OPS in approximately
20 percent of the cases. In the remaining cases, offender institution files
and offender supervision field files were reviewed to determine victim-

19

Relying on many different criminal justice actors to define victim-offender
relationship may be considered problematic in that the definition of terms may not
be consistent. Inconsistency in the operationalization of the independent variable is
a threat to the reliability and validity of the study's findings. This threat is reduced
because of the general social agreement regarding the definition of an intimate
relationship. The terms girlfriend and wife are generally defined in American
culture as involving commitment, emotional and sexual intimacy and particular role
responsibilities (Carlson, 1987). Criminal justice actors, such as police, prosecutors,
judges and corrections personnel, respond to intimate violence in the context of
their individual perceptions of the definition of an intimate relationship and what
rights and responsibilities that intimacy implies (Myers, 1989).
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offender relationship. 20 When the institution and field files failed to
provide the necessary information, individual probation and post-prison
supervision officers and institution counselors were contacted. 21 These
individuals were able to provide victim-offender relationship information
by either: 1. their personal knowledge of the specific details of the
incident and/or victim, 2. contacting district attorneys' offices and
requesting the information from prosecutorial files, 3. requesting a copy of
the original police report, or 4. interviewing the offender. 22
In the event that there was more than one serious assault conviction
stemming from the same incident, the victim of the most serious assault
conviction was used to determine victim-offender relationship. For
example, if an offender were convicted of committing an Assault I against

20

Offender institution files are created for those offenders who are sentenced
to prison and are maintained within the particular correctional facility that houses
the individual offenders. Each offender's institution file may contain all or some of
the following documents: police reports, presentence investigation report, treatment
reports, court documents, narrative provided by prison intake counselors, institution
behavior reports and miscellaneous offender-specific materials, such as victim
notification requests. For those offenders who receive a sentence of probation for
their crime, field files are created and maintained within the county of the offender's
supervision. Field files differ somewhat from institution files in that they contain
chronologies of the offenders' behavior during the period of correctional
supervision, and they lack intake counselor narrative and institution behavior
reports.
21

Institution counselors and probation and parole/post-prison supervision
officers were consulted in 58 (10.7%) cases. Victim-offender relationship in six of
the cases was obtained directly from the files of the Multnomah county district
attorney's office.
22

cases.

Victim-offender relationship was determined via offender interview in five
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a neighbor and an Assault III against his wife as part of the same violent
incident, the offender was defined as a non intimate violence offender. 23
Using the data-collection methods described above, victim-offender
relationship could not be determined in eight, or .02 percent, of the cases.
Due to the absence of information on the independent variable, these cases
were removed from all analyses, thereby reducing the population to 468
offenders.
The five categorical measures of sentencing outcomes, type of
sentence, type of guidelines departure, direction of guidelines departure,
gun minimum sentence and use of optional probation, were analyzed
through the use of chi-square tests. 24 The continuous measures of
sentencing outcome, length of sentence, length of duration departure,
number of custody units and the number of jail days, were analyzed
through the use of !-tests for independent samples and multiple linear

23

This situation very rarely arose among the defined population. In the event
that an offender was convicted of two counts of the same type of serious assault,
such as Assault II, the victim of the first count determined victim-offender
relationship. For example, if an offender were convicted of two counts of
Attempted Assault I and the victim listed in the first count was the ex-girlfriend of
the assailant, that individual would have been recorded as an intimate violence
offender. If, however, the victim listed in the first count were a nonintimate, the
offender would have been counted as a nonintimate violence offender. No
offenders were found to have been convicted of two counts of the same type of
serious assault with both an intimate and a nonintimate listed as the victims, in any
order.
24

While these are not analytically ideal levels of measurement, categorical
data have been recognized as one typical feature of criminal case-processing
research (Straus, 1993 ).
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regression. For purposes of regression analyses, several categorical
variables were collapsed into dichotomous variables and included some
measures of offender demographics (see Appendix E). 25

25

Offender demographics, such as age, race and jurisdiction, may affect case
processing (Miller, 1994; Oregon Criminal Justice Council, 1994; D'Alessio &
Stolzenbery, 1993; Crank, 1992; Albonetti, 1991; Chen, 1991; Erez & Tontodonata,
1990; Mohr, 1990; Spohn, 1990; Schmidt & Steury, 1989; Casper, 1988; Daly,
1987; Langan, 1985). Within several of the regression models, variables were
included to control for the affects of offender demographics, such as race and
county of conviction.

CHAPTER V
RESULTS
Seventy (15%) of the 468 offenders were intimate violence
offenders, while 398 (85%) were nonintimate violence offenders. The
average age of the intimate violence offenders was 31.5 years and of the
non intimate violence offenders was 28. 0 years. This difference in average
age was statistically significant! (466)=2.85, n_<.05. The majority of
intimate and nonintimate violence offenders were white. Thirty-nine
(5 5. 7%) intimate violence offenders and 281 (70. 6%) nonintimate violence
offenders were white. Most of the nonwhite intimate violence offenders
were African American, accounting for 3 0 percent of all intimate violence
offenders and 13 .1 percent of all nonintimate violence offenders (see
Table I).
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Table_]_
Racial Distribution of Intimate and Nonintimate Violence Offenders
Intimate
N = 70

Nonintimate
N = 398

White

39
55.7%

281
70.6%

African
American

21
30.0%

52
13.1%

Hispanic

9
12.9%

46
11.6%

0

-

10
2.5%

1
1.4%

9
2.3%

Race

Native
American
Asian

Of intimate violence offenders, 41 (58.6%) were convicted of either
Assault III or Attempted Assault II and 229 (57.5%) nonintimate violence
offenders were convicted of one of these crimes. Twenty-nine intimate
violence offenders (41.4%) were convicted of one of the more legally
serious forms of assault, Assault I, II or Attempted Assault I. One
hundred sixty-nine (42.5%) nonintimate violence offenders were convicted
of one of these more serious forms of assault (see Table 2). There is a
significant difference among the type of assault conviction of intimate and
nonintimate violence offenders x 2 (9, N=468}=38.0661, n<.05. The
greatest difference appears to be in an under-representation of intimate
violence offenders in the Assault III category and an over-representation
of the same in the Attempted Assault II category. Of the seven intimate
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violence offenders convicted of Assault I and Attempted Assault I, three
were seen by the judge or jury as having been provoked by a victim who
"substantially precipitated" in the assault, as evidenced by the reduced
seriousness ranking of the crime. Of the 53 nonintimate violence
offenders convicted of the same crimes, 22 ( 42%) were seen as similarly
provoked by the assault victim.
Table--1
Intimate and Nonintimate Violence Offenders By Most Serious
Crime of Conviction

Crime

Intimate
N = 70

Nonintimate
N = 398

Completed
Assault III

17
24.3%

192
48.2%

Attempted
Assault II

24
34.3%

37
9.3%

Completed
Assault II

22
31.4%

110
27.6%

Attempted
Assault I

3
4.3%

26
5.6%

Completed
Assault I

4
5.7%

36
9.0%

About sixty-seven percent of intimate violence offenders and 66.6
percent of nonintimate violence offenders, were grouped within the three
least extensive criminal history categories, I, H and G (see Appendix F for
a table of the criminal history categories of intimate and nonintimate
violence offenders). About 30 percent of all offenders were under some
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form of correctional supervision at the time the assault was committed.
Sixteen (22.9%) intimate violence offenders were on probation at the time
of the assault and six (8.6%) were on parole or post-prison supervision.
Eighty-six (21.6%) nonintimate violence offenders were on probation at
the time of the assault, while 33 (8.3%) were on parole or post-prison
supervision. 26

Hypotheses Tests
~

of Sentence
Nearly identical percentages of intimate and nonintimate violence

offenders were sentenced to probation and prison. Of intimate violence
offenders, 43 (61.4%) were sentenced to probation, while 246 (61.8%)
nonintimate violence offenders were sentenced to probation. Similarly, 27
(3 8.6%) intimate violence offenders were sentenced to prison and 152
(3 8.2%) nonintimate violence offenders were sentenced to prison (see
Table 4). Overall, 15 percent of the offenders sentenced to prison were
intimate violence offenders. This represents a slightly larger percentage
of intimate violence offenders among those sentenced to prison for felony
assault than the 12 percent found by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (1993)
in its survey of male state prisoners. Of the 43 intimate violence
offenders sentenced to probation, 15 (34. 9%) had a presumptive sentence

26

In the cases of two nonintimate violence offenders, supervision status at the
time of the assault could not be determined.
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under the sentencing guidelines of prison. Of the 246 nonintimate
violence offenders sentenced to probation, 66 (26.8%) had a presumptive
sentence of prison. One intimate violence offender and four non intimate
violence offenders had a presumptive sentence of probation, but were
sentenced to prison (see Table 3 ). 27
Table_]_
Intimate and Nonintimate By Sentence Type Given
and Presumptive Sentence Type*

Type of Sentence

Intimate
N = 70

Nonintimate
N = 398

Given Presumptive
Probation

28
40.0%

180
45.2%

Given NonPresumptive Probation

15
21.4%

66
16.6%

Given Presumptive
Prison

26
37.1%

148
37.2%

Given NonPresumptive Prison

I

4

-

-

• Columns do not add to 100% due to rounding

Length of Sentence
Length of sentence was examined by type of sentence, because
probation and prison sentences are qualitatively different types of
sentences. For those intimate violence offenders sentenced to probation,

27

A chi-square test could not be preformed on the differences in presumptive
and given sentence type for intimate and nonintimate violence offenders due to the
small numbers of intimate and nonintimate violence offenders in some cells.
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the average length of sentence was 3 5 .4 months. The average length of
sentence for nonintimate violence offenders sentenced to probation was
37.0 months. This difference in means is statistically significant

t

(287)=

-2. 76, 12<.05 (see Table 4). Length of probation sentence was regressed on
a number of independent variables thought to be predictive of probation
length; presumptive probation length, criminal history, guidelines
departure, presumptive sentence type, type of crime, victim-offender
relationship and supervision status. Victim-offender relationship was not
significant when these other variables were taken into account. Variables
found to significantly predict length of probation sentence were
presumptive probation length and supervision status (see Appendix G).
Intimate violence offenders who were sentenced to prison received a
mean sentence of 23 .1 months and nonintimate violence offenders
sentenced to prison received an average of 31 months. This difference in
sentence length was not significant. Length of prison sentence was
regressed on several variables; presumptive sentence type, minimum
presumptive sentence length, type of crime, criminal history, victimoffender relationship and supervision status. Of these variables, the only
one found to significantly predict length of prison sentence was minimum
presumptive sentence length (see Appendix G).
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Table3
Type and Length of Sentence of Intimate
and Nonintimate Violence Offenders
Intimate
N = 70

Nonintimate
N = 398

Sentence Tyne
Probation
Prison

43 (61.4%)
27 (38.6%)

246 (61.8%)
152 {38.2%)

Average
Sentence Length
Probation
Prison

35.4 months
23.1 months

37.0 months
31.0 months

Variable

Number of Custody Units and Jail Days
The mean number of custody units given to intimate violence
offenders as a part of their probation sentences was 115 and to
nonintimate violence offenders was 124. This difference in means was not
statistically significant. Custody units were regressed on a number of
variables; criminal history, type of crime, supervision status, guidelines
departure, presumptive sentence type, county of conviction, victimoffender relationship and racial minority. The variable that was found to
be significant in predicting number of custody units offenders were
sentenced to was the county of conviction (see Appendix H). 28
Intimate violence offenders were sentenced to an average of 44

28

Multnomah county sentenced probationers to an average of 108, while the
other Oregon counties, in toto, sentenced probationers to an average of 132 custody
units. This difference in means is statistically significant t (242) = -2.67, 12 <.05.
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days in jail, while non intimate violence offenders were sentenced to an
average of 45 days. This difference is not statistically significant. One
intimate violence offender was sentenced to serve 3 60 days in jail as part
of his probation sentence, twice the number of jail days given to any other
offender. 29 Removing this offender from the group resulted in a reduction
of the average number of jail days from 43 to 36 days. The removal of
this extreme case does not produce a significant difference between the
average number of jail days given to intimate and nonintimate violence
offenders. Number of jail days was regressed on several independent
variables; criminal history, type of crime, supervision status, guidelines
departure, length of probation sentence, county of conviction, victimoffender relationship and number of custody units. The variables that
were found to be significant in predicting length of jail sentence were type
of crime, county of conviction, length of probation and number of custody
units. Jo

29

30

No explanation was offered as to why such a lengthy departure was justified.

It is not surprising that the number of custody units given is predictive of
the length of jail sentences. Judges frequently sentenced offenders to the same
number of custody units and jail days. As with custody units, Multnomah county
sentenced probationers to significantly fewer jail days, with an average of 33 days,
compared to an average jail sentence of 54 days from the other Oregon counties t
(289) = 3.56, J2<.05. Those probationers convicted of Assault III and Attempted
Assault II were sentenced to serve an average of 41 days in jail, while those
convicted of the more legally serious assault crimes were sentenced to serve an
average of 58 days in jail ! (88) = 1.96, n =.05.

39
Use of Optional Probation
Of the 13 eligible intimate violence offenders, ten (76. 9%) were
granted optional probation. 31 Of the 49 nonintimate violence offenders
eligible, 3 7 (75. 5%) were granted optional probation. 32 All three of the
intimate violence offenders who were denied optional probation were
given the maximum presumptive prison sentence. In none of the cases, did

the sentencing judge record a reason why optional probation was not
granted. The small number of intimate violence offenders prohibited
statistical comparisons of judicial discretion in the granting of optional
probation to intimate and nonintimate violence offenders.
Gun Minimum Sentence
Firearms were used by eight ( 12. 9%) intimate violence offenders
and 39 (9.8%) nonintimate violence offenders. Two of these intimate
violence offenders and eight of these nonintimate violence offenders were
given gun minimum sentences. The number of offenders is too small to
allow comparisons of judicial discretion in the use of gun minimum

31

Three intimate violence offenders were within the proper grid blocks for
optional probation, 8-1, 8-H and 8-1, but were ineligible to receive it. One intimate
violence offender was ineligible because of his supervision status at the time of the
commission of the assault. Two were ineligible for optional probation because of
the use of a firearm during the assault.
32

Eight nonintimate violence offenders who were ineligible for optional
probation were, nonetheless, given probation sentences. Seven of them were given
probation as a downward dispositional departure. The judge granted optional
probation to the eighth, even though he was ineligible, due to his supervision status
at the time of the assault.
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sentences between intimate and nonintimate violence offenders.
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The fact that 48 offenders used firearms and only I 0 gun minimum
sentences were given is surprising because Oregon law (ORS 161.610)
mandates such a sentence in these cases. While the law provides the
option of departure from the length of the gun minimum sentence, it does
not allow discretion in its use. 34
Direction and Type of Sentencing Guidelines Departure
Thirteen (18.6%) intimate violence offenders were given sentences
that departed from Oregon's sentencing guidelines. Eighty-nine (22.4%)
nonintimate violence offenders were given sentences that departed from
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Both of the intimate violence offenders given a gun minimum sentence were
convicted of Assault I. One of these offenders was sentenced to 5 5 months in
prison, a departure from the 60 month gun minimum. He was on probation at the
time of the commission of the assault. Of the seven intimate violence offenders
who were not given gun minimum sentences, four were convicted of Assault II.
One of them was convicted of Attempted Assault I, another of Attempted Assault II
and the remaining offender for Assault III. Three were on supervision status.
Three were sentenced to probation. One of these probationers was given a
downward dispositional departure, as if it were the presumptive sentence type,
despite the fact that the offender was under post-prison supervision at the time of
the commission of the assault.
34

In several cases in which a victim was shot by the offender, the gun was not
considered during the process of conviction and sentencing. For example, one
offender committed a drive-by shooting at the home of a rival gang member. He
was arrested for Attempted Assault I With A Firearm and additional charges,
including Ex-Felon in Possession of A Firearm. The sentencing order read that he
had plead guilty to the charge of Attempted Assault I. The order stated that the
charge of Ex-Felon in Possession of A Firearm was dismissed, as was the phrase
"With A Firearm," formerly part of the Attempted Assault I charge. This offender
was not given a gun minimum sentence, in fact, the sentencing guidelines
worksheet submitted to the OCJC stated that a gun was not involved.
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the sentencing guidelines. One (1.4%) intimate violence offender was
given an upward departure sentence and 28 (7%) nonintimate violence
offenders were given an upward departure sentence. Downward departures
were given to 12 (17.1%} intimate violence offenders and to 63 (15.8%)
nonintimate violence offenders (see Table 5). The small number of
departures did not permit statistical analyses.

Durational departure sentences were given to 65 (13.9%) offenders,
overall. Eight intimate violence offenders were given sentences that were
durational departures. One (1.4%) intimate violence offender was given
an upward durational departure sentence and seven ( 10%) were given
sentences that were downward durational departures. 35 The non intimate

35

The intimate violence offender who received an upward durational departure
was a white 43-year-old male who assaulted his girlfriend. He was convicted of
Assault II, had a criminal history category of D, and was on probation at the time
of the assault. The court increased his presumptive prison sentence by 10 months,
ordered him to complete alcohol and drug treatment and to undergo a mental health
evaluation. Aggravating factors cited by the judge were; deliberate cruelty to
victim, persistent similar offenses and other factors.
Six of the seven intimate violence offenders who were given downward
durational departure were convicted and sentenced in Multnomah county. One was
convicted of Assault m, three of Attempted Assault II, one of Assault II, one of
Attempted Assault I and one was convicted of Assault I. Four of the intimate
violence offenders were under correctional supervision at the time of the
commission of the assault. Two of the offenders were white, four were African
American and one was Hispanic. The mitigating factors cited were; defendant's
mental capacity, other factors and offense accomplished by another. The latter
factor was cited in the sentencing order of an offender who captured and restrained
his former girlfriend, so that his current girlfriend could assault her. No mitigating
factors were cited in the sentencing of two of the intimate violence offenders. The
departure sentences were given as if the abbreviated length were the offenders'
presumptive sentences.
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violence offenders given departure sentences were more equally split
between upward and downward durational departures. Twenty-eight (7%)
nonintimate violence offenders received upward durational departures and
29 (7.3%) received downward durational departures (see Table 5).
Dispositional departures were given to 44 (9.4%) offenders, overall.
Five (7.1 %) intimate violence offenders received dispositional departures
and all of these were downward from prison to probation. 36 Of the
nonintimate violence offenders, three (0. 8%) received upward departures
from probation to prison and 3 6 (9%) received downward departures from
prison to probation (see Table 5). The small number of intimate violence
offenders given dispositional and durational departures prohibits statistical
analyses of group differences.

36

All five of the intimate violence offenders who were given probation, instead
of prison, were convicted of assaulting their present or former girlfriends. The
mitigating factors cited to justify these dispositional departures were; defendant's
cooperation with the state, conviction free for a significant period of time and other
factors. One offender, whose presumptive sentence was 41 to 45 months in prison,
was sentenced to 36 months probation, drug treatment and no days in jail. His
criminal history category was A and he was convicted of Assault II. The mitigating
factor cited to justify the departure was "other factors." Another offender sentenced
in Multnomah county, was under post-prison supervision at the time of the assault.
He was convicted of Attempted Assault II and was sentenced to 36 months
probation, instead of 10 to 12 months in prison. Although a gun was involved in
the assault, no gun minimum sentence was given and the offender was not
sentenced to any jail time or any number of custody units. No mitigating factors
were cited. The judge gave this sentence as if it were derived from Oregon's
sentencing guidelines.
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Table-2
Intimate and Nonintimate Violence Offenders
By Direction and Type of Guidelines Departure
Intimate
N = 70

Nonintimate
N = 398

I (7%)

28 (29%)

Downward Durational

7 (54%)

29 (30%)

Upward Dispositional

-

3 (3%)

5 (39%)

36 (38%)

Departure
Upward Durational

Downward Dispositional

Length of Durational Departures
Because only one intimate violence offender received an upward
durational departure, the average length of upward duration departures of
intimate and nonintimate violence offenders can not be meaningful
compared. 37 The average length of downward durational departure for
intimate violence offenders sentenced to prison was 8.2 months shorter
than the guidelines presumptive sentence. The average downward
durational departure for nonintimate violence offenders sentenced to
prison was 7. 8 months shorter than the guidelines' sentence.
Since only one intimate violence offender who received a downward
durational departure was sentenced to probation, the length of durational
departure for intimate and nonintimate violence offenders sentenced to

37

The intimate violence offender received a sentence of I 0 months longer than
the sentence prescribed by the guidelines.
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probation was not compared. 38

38

The intimate violence offender was sentenced to 24 months of probation,
which was a downward durational departure of 12 months. The judge gave this
reduced sentence as if it were a presumptive sentence derived from the guidelines.

CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
Summary of Results
The purpose of this study was to test the hypothesis that intimate
violence offenders convicted of serious assaults receive more lenient
punishment than nonintimate violence offenders. Data were used to
evaluate seven research hypotheses. Below, each hypothesis is listed
followed by a discussion of findings.
1. Intimate violence offenders are more likely than nonintimate violence
offenders to receive a sentence~ of probation.
The data revealed that a nearly identical proportion of intimate and
nonintimate violence offenders were sentenced to probation. This finding
of no difference lends no support to the research hypothesis. However,
when presumptive sentence type was taken into account, proportionately
more intimate violence offenders with a presumptive sentence of prison
were given probation than nonintimate violence offenders. This
supporting evidence must be considered anecdotal because statistical tests
could not be performed due to an inadequate number of offenders in two
of the categories of comparison.
2. Intimate violence offenders receive shorter sentences than nonintimate
violence offenders.
This hypothesis, if taken at face value, found support among those
offenders sentenced to probation, but not among those sentenced to prison.
Intimate violence offenders sentenced to probation were, indeed, given
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shorter sentences than nonintimate violence offenders. The regression
analyses of probation length showed when other factors were taken into
account, victim-offender relationship did not significantly influence
sentence length. The average prison sentence of intimate violence
offenders was shorter than nonintimate violence offenders but this
difference was not statistically significant. These findings do not lend
support to the assertion that intimate violence offenders receive shorter
sentences than nonintimate violence offenders.
3. Intimate violence offenders are sentenced to fewer custody uni ts and
jail days than nonintimate violence offenders.
This hypothesis was not supported by the data. While intimate
violence offenders sentenced to probation were given, on average, fewer
custody units and jail days than nonintimate violence offenders, this
difference was not statistically significant.
4. Eligible intimate violence offenders are more likely than eligible
nonintimate violence offenders to be given optional probation. instead of
pnson.
Intimate and nonintimate violence offenders were granted optional
probation in similar proportions thus lending no support to the research
hypothesis.
5. Intimate violence offenders who used firearms during the commission
of the assault are less likely than nonintimate violence offenders to receive
~_gyn minimum sentence.
The numbers of intimate and nonintimate violence offenders who
used firearms and received gun minimum sentences were too small to
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address this hypothesis.
6. When there are departures from presumptive sentences. both downward
dispositional and downward durational departures are more likely in the
sentencing of intimate violence offenders than in the sentencing of
nonintimate violence offenders.

The number of intimate violence offenders who received guidelines
departures of any kind was very small, disallowing comparisons of the
type and direction of sentencing guidelines departures.
7. Downward durational departures result in shorter sentences for intimate
violence offenders than nonintimate violence offenders.
While the downward durational departures did result in shorter
average prison sentences for intimate violence offenders than nonintimate
violence offenders, this finding cannot support the above hypothesis
because it is based on very few cases.
One of the main findings of this study is that, in felony assault
cases, sentencing decisions are more likely to reflect the provisions of
Oregon's sentencing guidelines than judges' views of the victim-offender
relationship. In other words, sentencing guidelines and not victimoffender relationship dictate the type and duration of punishment for
felony assaults in Oregon. Once intimate violence offenders are convicted
of felony assault, they do not appear to receive more lenient punishment
than nonintimate violence offenders. It is possible that Oregon's
sentencing guidelines counteracted the influence of patriarchal values in
the sentencing of intimate violence offenders. Despite the guidelines'
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possible effect on victim-offender relationship, there was evidence that
other extralegal factors, i. e. supervision status and county of conviction,
had some influence on sentencing. These results support other findings
that extralegal factors may not be completely ruled out under sentencing
guidelines (Miller, 1994; OCJC, 1994; Oregon Supreme Court Task Force,
1994; D'Alessio & Stolzenberg, 1993).

Since the present study did not find evidence that victim-offender
relationship was among the extralegal factors influencing sentencing
outcomes, this finding may lend support to the conclusion that patriarchal
values do not exist within the sentencing phase of the Oregon criminal
justice process. However, it is also possible that effects of patriarchal
values are merely minimized by the decision rules set forth under the
guidelines. In order to determine the specific effects of sentencing
guidelines, a similar study could be undertaken that would compare the
sentencing outcomes of intimate and nonintimate violence offenders in
jurisdictions with and without sentencing guidelines. If intimate violence
offenders are punished more leniently in jurisdictions without guidelines
and equally or less leniently in jurisdictions with guidelines, this finding
would lend support to the hypothesis that the presence of guidelines
mitigates the influence of patriarchal values on the severity of punishment.
It is also possible that the recently increased concern over violence in the

United States has made intimate violence a high priority crime, a concern
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that may reduce the influence of victim-offender relationship in sentencing
decisions.
Previous research has shown that leniency toward intimate violence
offenders may be shown at other phases of the criminal justice system
(Cohen, 1994; Buzawa & Buzawa, 1993; Hart, 1993; Ford, 1991; McGuire,
1991; Crowley, Sigler & Johnson, 1990; Gondolf & McFerron, 1989; Erez,

1986; Langan & Innes, 1986; Lerman, 1986; Ellis, 1984; Worden &
Pollitz, 1984; McLeod, 1983; Stanko, 1982; Davis & Smith, 1981; Brosi,
1979; Do bash & Do bash, 1979). Police and prosecutors often decide the
fate of offenders before any judicial proceedings take place. When police
officers do not arrest and prosecutors do not charge intimate violence
offenders for reasons other than lack of evidence, these offenders escape
without punishment. Intimate violence offenders who are offered a plea
bargain that downgrades a serious assault to a misdemeanor or an
attempted murder to an Assault III, are afforded leniency before their
cases ever reach the sentencing phase of the criminal justice process and,
therefore, before sentencing guidelines come into play.
In support of other research findings (Hart, 1993; Ford, 1991;
McGuire, 1991; Crowley, Sigler & Johnson, 1990; Lerman, 1986; Ellis,
1984; McLeod, 1983; Stanko, 1982; Brosi, 1979), the present study found
some evidence of possible prosecutorial downgrading of charges in
intimate violence cases. Significantly more intimate than nonintimate
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violence offenders were found among those convicted of the attempted
assault crimes. Attempted assaults are given seriousness rankings two
levels below the rankings of the completed crimes. In some cases, when
intimate violence offender were convicted of an attempted assault, it was
not that the assault had not been completed. Police reports stated that
victim interviews were conducted after the victim received medical
treatment at a hospital. These victims had been shot, stabbed, physically
beaten and run over with vehicles. In one case, a man stabbed his ex-wife
with a knife. She ran from the house, bleeding, while the offender chased
her with the knife. The man was arrested on a variety of charges,
including attempted murder. He was convicted of Attempted Assault II,
via a plea bargain, for attempting to stab her with the knife with which he
had already stabbed her. Instead of spending the presumptive 21 to 22
months in prison for completed Assault II, he received a presumptive
sentence of 36 months probation.
Given the findings of this study, it might be advisable to retest the
theoretical hypothesis using data from those component of the criminal
justice process that are afforded more discretion than the courts under
sentencing guidelines. Police departments and prosecutor's offices with no
or very limited policies regarding the handling of intimate violence cases
may treat intimate violence offenders with more leniency than departments
and offices that limit the use of discretion. Arrest and investigation
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practices of police in intimate violence cases compared to nonintimate
violence cases may be examined, as well as prosecutorial charging and
plea bargain decision-making. Do prosecutors offer more lenient "deals"
to intimate violence offenders than to nonintimate violence offenders? For
example, in some cases, intimate violence offender became nonintimate
violence offenders during the plea bargaining process. One such instance
involved an offender who attempted to stab his ex-girlfriend. When a
male passerby came to the aid of the woman, the assailant attempted to
stab him, as well. The offender was arrested for the attempted assault of
both people. In exchange for a guilty plea, the prosecutor dropped all
charges in connection with the attempted assault of the woman. Since
prosecutors are more free from public scrutiny than police, more lenient
treatment of intimate violence offenders may be found within the
prosecutorial arena.
Limitations

The findings of this study are not applicable to intimate violence
offenders who were convicted of any crime other than completed or
attempted Assault I, II and III as the major offense or who are exempted
from Oregon's sentencing guidelines. Excluding those offenders with
convictions for more serious crimes than assault created a more
homogeneous population, but this exclusion also disqualified some
intimate violence cases. For example, one intimate violence case involved
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a man who broke down the door to the home of his ex-girlfriend (his
former residence) and proceeded to assault her. On his way out, he took
the television. When the case was decided, the man was convicted of
Assault III and Burglary I, for the theft of the television from an occupied
dwelling. Presumably, the man's primary motivation for going to the
home was not to take the television, but to assault his former partner.
This case had to be excluded from consideration because Burglary I has a
seriousness rank of nine and Assault III has a ranking of six. The
inclusion of cases with any felony assault conviction, regardless of
seriousness ranking, may have produced a different picture of sentencing
of intimate violence cases. 39
Analyses were limited by the relatively small number of intimate
violence offenders among convicted assaulters. About half of the
theoretical predictions could not be tested due to the lack of sufficient
data on intimate violence offenders. Future studies of intimate violence
offenders among felony populations should cast a wider net, perhaps by
reviewing more than one year of felony assault cases. The present study
did not record the gender of the victim in nonintimate violence cases and,
therefore, the impact of victim gender on the findings is unknown.

39

Including those offenders with any felony assault conviction would have
also allowed the examination of the hypothesis that, in the majority of convictions
for intimate violence assaults, the assault was not the most legally serious crime of
conviction. It might be that criminal justice actors view the theft of property, for
example, as more serious than the beating of an intimate partner.
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The difficulty in obtaining victim-offender relationship information
prevented the determination of victim-offender relationship in prior
criminal convictions, lesser offenses, previous arrests and the original
arrest charges. This clearly limits understanding of the criminal justice
processing of intimate violence cases. Criminal history information for
example, cannot be used to infer other convictions for intimate violence
because victim-offender relationship could only be determined for the
1993 felony assault conviction. Likewise, convictions for lesser offenses
at the same time as the 1993 assault conviction could not be assumed to
have involved the same victim. 40 No information is provided regarding
previous arrests or the nature of the charges brought against the offender
at the time of the arrest that lead to the 1993 felony assault conviction.
Because of the lack of arrest information and the limited nature of the
prosecution data, this study cannot provide a complete picture of the
criminal justice processing of intimate violence in the state of Oregon.

40

Only a few cases were identified that involved a nonintimate listed as the
victim of the most serious assault and an intimate listed a the victim of a less
serious offense. It seemed that in most of the intimate violence cases, either the
intimate was viewed as the primary victim of the violent incident, or not treated as
a victim at all. For example, a woman and her husband lived in the apartment
above her sister and her sister's boyfriend. One evening, the woman heard sounds
of a struggle and her sister screaming. The woman's husband ran downstairs to
rescue his sister-in-law from an assault. When he arrived, the man observed his
sister-in-law being kicked by her boyfriend. The brother-in-law was then attacked
by the boyfriend, who brutally beat the rescuer as well. As the result of a plea
bargain, the assailant was convicted for the assault of the brother-in-law and not his
girlfriend, despite the severe injuries caused to the woman.
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APPENDIX A
Criminal History Categories

OAR 253-04-007 CRIM1NAL HISTORY CATEGORIES. The criminal history categories in the
Criminal History Scale are:
Criminal
History
Categorv

Descriotive Criminal Historv

A

The . offender's criminal history includes three or more person felonies in any
combination of adult convictions or juvenile adjudications.

B

The offender's criminal history includes two person felonies in any combination of
adult convictions or juvenile adjudications.

c

The offender's criminal history includes one adult conviction or juvenile adjudication
for a person .felony; and one or more adult conviction or juvenile adjudication for
a non-person Felony.

D

The offender's criminal history includes one adult conviction or juvenile adjudication
for a person felony; but no adult conviction or juvenile adjudications for a nonperson felony.

E

The offender's criminal history includes four or more adult convictions for. nonperson felonies but no adult conviction or juvenile adjudication for a person. felony.

F

The· offender's criminal history includes two or three adult convictions for nonperson felonies but no adult conviction or juvenile adjudication for a person feioo.r.

G

The offender's crimin~l history includes four or more adult convictions for aa.Ss
A misdemeanors: one adult conviction for a non-person felony; or three or more
juvenile adjudications for non-person felonies, but no adult conviction or juvenile
adjudication for a person felony.
·

H

The offender's criminal history includes no adult felony conviction or juvenile
adjudication for a person felony; no more than two juvenile adjudications for nonperson felonies; and no more than three adult convictions for Class A misdemeanors.

I

The offender's criminal history docs not include any juvenile adjudication for a
felony or any adult conviction for a felony or aass A misdemeanor.

OAR 253-04-008 PERSON CUSS A ADULT MISDEMEANOR CONVICTIONS. Every two
prior adult convictions of person Oass A misdemeanors in the offender's criminal history shall be
counted as one adult .conviction of a person felony for criminal history purposes.

APPENDIX 8
Sentencing Guidelines Grid
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APPENDIX C
Mitigating and Aggravating Factors
Mitigating and aggravating factors are cited as the statutorily relevant
reasons for presumptive sentence departures. Each factor is assigned a
letter and a judge may cite more than one factor.
Mitigating Factors
A.
Victim involvement
B.
Defendant under duress,
C.

Defendant's mental capacity

D.
E.
F.
G.
H.

Offense accomplished by another
Defendant's minor role
Defendant's cooperation with the state
Harm or loss less than typical
Conviction free for a significant period
Other

I.

Aggravating Factors
A.
Deliberate cruelty to victim
B.
Victim particularly vulnerable
C.
Violence toward victim or witness
D.
Persistent involvement in similar offenses
E.
Weapon use
F.
Violation of public trust
G.
Multiple victims or incidents
H.
Crime part of organized operation
I.
Permanent injury to person
J.
Harm/loss greater than typical
K.
Motivated by race, religion or sexual orientation of the victim
L.
Other

APPENDIX D
Sentencing Guidelines Worksheet

PART A

·PLEASE PRESS FIRMLY
1

Court

Ca•• I

First

2 OHender'a Laat Nam•

3 Sex

Ml

I 4 Birthdat•

10 Male
zOFemale

5 County of Sentencing

8 Date Found Cuilty

7 SID f

6 Rae•
10Wh11e

SO Asian

30NaL Am.
40Hispanic

20 Black

sOOther
10 Supervision Status At Otf•na•

9 Cuilty By
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CLASSIFICATION

B

A

c

D

E

F

G

H

I

(CIRCLE}
Record all prior felony and A-misdemeanor convictions on Criminal History Worksh. . t and attach. ...iij

29 The presumptive guideline sentence tor the primary offense is:
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47 Thia prison t•nn runs:

_ _ _ d•ys
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APPENDIX E
Dichotomous Variables Used in Regression Analyses
Criminal History collapses the nine categories of criminal history to two
categories. One category combines criminal history categories H and I,
which contains offenders with no criminal convictions or no felony
convictions. The other category combines criminal history categories A
through G, which may have numerous misdemeanor and felony
convictions. The dichotomous criminal history variable permitted
comparison of offenders with no or very limited criminal history, with
those that have a more extensive criminal history.

Tufil of Crime combines the two less legally serious types of assault.
Assault III and Attempted Assault II were combined because they both
receive the same seriousness ranking. Combined, they represent the less
serious category of felony assault. The other three crimes, Assault II,
Attempted Assault I and Assault I are grouped together into another
category to represent the more legally serious crimes.
Departure is a variable created to indicate the presence or absence of a
sentencing guidelines departure.
Supervision status was created by combining both kinds of supervision
statuses. One category represented offenders who were under some form
of correctional supervision status at the time of the commission of the
assault. The second category represents intimate offenders under no
supervision status at the time of the commission of the crime.
Presumptive sentence was created by including offenders with a
presumptive sentence of prison in one category and offenders with a
presumptive sentence of probation in the other category.
County of Conviction was created by including the state's most populous
county, Multnomah, and all other counties in another.
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APPENDIX F
Criminal History Categories of
Intimate and Nonintimate Violence Offenders

Category

Intimate
N = 70

Nonintimate
N = 398

A

1
1.4%

6
1.5%

B

1
1.4%

17
4.3%

c

8
11.4%

41
10.3%

D

7
10.0%

28
7.0%

E

3
4.3%

10
2.5%

F

3
4.3%

31
7.8%

G

9
12.9%

59
14.8%

H

17
24.3

70
17.6%

I

21
30.0%

136
34.2%
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APPENDIX G
Regression Tables: Length of Probation and Prison
Length of Probation Sentence
Regression Table
Independent Variable

t value

Presumptive Probation
Length

8. 728**

Criminal History

.263

Guidelines Departure

.111

Presumptive Sentence

.038

Type of Crime

-1.061

Intimate Relationship

-1.097

2.834**
Supervision Status
*p<.05, **p<.01
df= 7
Length of Prison Sentence
Regression Table
Independent Variable

t value

Minimum Presumptive
Length

23.177**
-1.80

Criminal History
Guidelines Departure

.14

Presumptive Sentence

-.552

Type of Crime

.58

Intimate Relationship
Supervision Status

-1.57
.33

p<.U), .,.... p

